// startup autopsy

MobilityDR

Dominican Republic ride-sharing competing against Uber (70%) and InDriver (25%) with a 6-month INTRANT authorization and $50K bond

competitionSlow Death

Years-long decline before final shutdown · Fatal mistake: Dominican Republic ride-sharing: Uber held 70%+ market share in Santo Domingo and Santiago. InDriver had 25% with driver-direct pricing. INTRANT (transport authority) required Authorization of Digital Mobility Platforms (6-month process + $50K bond). Three-app market (Uber + InDriver + 1 other) with no viable position for a fourth entrant.

Founded	2019
Closed	2022
Country	Dominican Republic
Sector	Mobility

// the model, blind

Evaluating only MobilityDR’s profile at its peak — without knowing the outcome — the model ranked Competition as the #1 likely cause. That’s exactly how it died.

Key Events Timeline

2019

FOUNDING

2021

CRISIS

2022

SHUTDOWN

Full Analysis

Free · no account needed

Documented cause

MobilityDR built ride-sharing in DR. Uber 70% + InDriver 25% = 95% of market. INTRANT 6-month authorization + $50K bond. Certified too late with no market gap.

Lesson

“Dominican Republic mobility must specialize in tourist transportation (6M annual tourists needing airport transfers and resort-to-city transport) — this segment is underserved by Uber's standard model and has higher willingness to pay.”

Failure anatomy

Collapse type

Slow Death

🐌 LOW

Hype cycle

None

Moat type

Technology

Fatal mistake

Dominican Republic ride-sharing: Uber held 70%+ market share in Santo Domingo and Santiago. InDriver had 25% with driver-direct pricing. INTRANT (transport authority) required Authorization of Digital Mobility Platforms (6-month process + $50K bond). Three-app market (Uber + InDriver + 1 other) with no viable position for a fourth entrant.